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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Till: E<~l'l'L\BLE LIFE ASSl'R-
.\\"CE SOCIETY OF THE I 
I.\ l TED STATES, a corporation, J 
Pl ai11 tiff-R cs pond c nt. ~· 
YS. 
r 
\ L \" lX H. "T AL KENHORST arnl , Case No . 
. i < >YC E "T ALKEN HORST. his Ios49 
11ii'c: HYDEH TRCCK RENTAL, , 
i \"C .. a corporation; UTAH INDCS- \ 
THL\L CO~DIISSION and CT,:\H 1 
ST.\TE TAX CO~E\IISSION, i 
Dcfcndants-Az1pclla11ts. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an action to reduce to judgment a promis-
~ory note and to foreclose the mortgage securing said 
note. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COCRT 
At pretrial of the case, the lower court .. 
d 
, . gra11tt11 
respon ent s motion for summarv 1'udgment b . d "' ase 1q t~~ pleadings, answers to interrogatories and the dep,, 
s1tion of appellant, Alvin R. ';y alkenhorst. 
HELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance of the judgment and decree entere( 
in the lower court. 
STATE.MEN'!' OF FACTS 
On June 29, 1963, appellants applied to the re· 
spondent for a joint life insurance policy in the amoun'. 
of $II,600.00 and each of the appellants named the 
other as beneficiary thereunder (R. 90-91). The policy. 
as a pp lied for, was declined and respondent offered 
to issue a rated policy in consideration of additional 
premium, which offer was accepted by appellants on 
July 12, 1963 (R. 88-89). Thereafter, the policy was 
issued as of July 12, 1963 and was given a register date 
of September 1, 1963 which is simply the day on which 
the first premium fell due thereunder. See payment 
card (Exhibit P-5). 
On July 1, 1963, the appellant, Alvin R. 'Valken· 
horst, applied to the respondent for a loan in the amount 
of $II,600.00 to be secured by a mortgage on his home 
at 2783 ~Iorningside Drive, Salt Lake City, rtah 
(Exhibit P-3). 
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Tlw loan application was apprm·ed, and on or 
.ilinut .I 11ly 18, HHW, the appellants executed a note, 
, 11 , q· t, ra, re a 11d ass igmnen t of life insurance awl com-] .~ I ...... 
J ltll''l tltl· loan transaction (Exhibits P-1, 2 and+). 
:),, .lllly l!I. HW:J. the mortgage was recorded in the 
l )Ji'1t·t· rd the County Hecorder, as shown on the original 
:J,,,·t111H 111 \Exhibit P-2). 
The payment record card (Exhibit P-5) shows 
: l1a \ a ppc!lauts did not make all payments promptly 
.1t't'•.n·di11g to the terms of the promissory note. li1 De-
.1ll!ilt'r of HH;;J, the appellants were three (:3) pay-
1;•,1 11h in arrears and on the 31st day of that month, 
,· J:t· p:i>·rne11b; were made and the loan reinstated. Ou 
. \ llµ-11st rn, HH>+, payments were due and owing for 
.I 1.1lll' .. July and August, and at that time, the loan again 
11 :h reinstated. On April 5, 1965, payments were made 
!'11r .J a11uary. February and ~1arch, and the loan was 
r('i11stated. On August 23, 1965, payments were made 
for .June and July of that year. The July payment 
11 as the tiiial payment made by appellants on the 
111r:rtg-ag·e loan and at the time of making that payment, 
,t tob I of twenty-three ( 23) monthly installments, or 
<>Ill' month short of two (2) years had been paid. In 
I lw foredosure complaint, it is alleged that payment 
uf the ..:\11gust 1, HW5 installment was not made and 
'>llch allegation is not denied by the appellants. 
The complaint also alleges that General Taxes for 
the ~Tars 19()+ and 1965 were delinquent and unpaid 
and that sewer assessments for 1964 and 1965 were 
3 
delinquent and unpaid. This allegation is rl · , . . · enieo 11 . 
appellants m their answer. The existence of th, 
tax delinquencies was well known to the app ll .ir e alir 
1\.lvin "ralkenhorst, as shown by his deposition ,,.l · · 
. · ltr•:ii 
1t appears that he was informed of the tax delinntiet 
1 ll'!t • 
011 several occasions by respondent's attornev~ 
1 
~ti 
deposition. Pages 17 and 23). · 
In October of 1965, after appellants liad liet: 
notified of the probability that foreclosure proeeedin11
1 ,., 
would be instituted, their attorney wrote the letter 11 1 
October 15, 1965 to the respondent's loan manager 
tendering the sum of $218.45 (R. 103-104). It shou:; 
be noted in connection with this so-called tender of rt· 
instatement that the amount tendered would not haw 
paid the loan installments, which were then due, includ-
ing the month of October, in the total amount of $325.74, 
nor was any off er or tender made of a redemption oi 
the delinquent taxes, both general and special for the 
preceding two years. It should further be noted that 
the desperate financial condition of appellants was 
fully revealed in this letter which sets forth in some 
detail the means used by the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
to effect collection of five ( 5) tax liens which they had 
filed against the appellants. In the light of Federal 
cases holding that the tax liens had priority over tax 
advances by mortgage lenders, it was impossible for 
the respondent to accept any reinstatement of this loan 
without a full payment of all delinquent general and 
special taxes which were outstanding against the mort-
gaged security. 
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Pl'rlwp.'i to resporulcnt's detriment, even in sud1 
,1 µ r:1, (' ~it 11a t ion. eYery opportunity was atf orcle1l a p-
; wl la n h to rc-p:1y the amounts owing and etfeet a rc-
1:1~1:ttcllll'llt of their obligation. It was not until Febru-
rn L l~lt)ti that the l'omplaint in foreclosure was filed 
,11 the l>1striet Court of Salt Lake County. It should 
\)( 1Pl!'d that appellants make no claim of having ever 
• 1 1:tlt-n·d -.ttflil'ic11t moneys to make redemption of the 
t;,\L·~ i11 question and pay in full all arrearages under 
,i:<·1r 11<1k to the respondent. 
ARGUl\1ENT 
POINT I 
TIIE THL\L COURT PROPERLY GRANT-
ED RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SC)l-
:'\L\ll Y .l lrDG l\IENT. 
In argument under their first point, appellants 
1·ik eases from various jurisdictions regarding the a p-
plieat ion of Rule .5() of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It :1ppcars to us that an appropriate case to have cited 
111 this regard is National American Life Insurance 
( '111111)1/11.11 t·s. Bayou CountrJJ Club, 16 Utah 2d 417, 
rn:~ P. :?cl :?f>. This case was cited by appellants on the 
q11e-;ti1m of usury. In the course of the opinion, this 
l'r111rt well summarizes the application of Rule 56. At 
Page 4:?1 of the Utah Reports, it is said 
"To a ffirrn the lower court on this point, we 
must conclude from an examination of the record 
there were no unresolved questions of disputed 
5 
11u~tc1afl fact, the .solution of which would he • 
quire or a verdict and judgment (E I " 
added.) . . . · mp 1a\11 
. "The rules permitting summary judgmer.'. 
should not. be enl~rged by construction ret 
1
, 
should be hber~lly mterpreted to effectuat~ their 
pur:pose to effect a prompt administration : 
justice and to expedite litigation bv avoi·d· 1
1 
dl . l h . . in~ n~e ess tria s w ere no triable issue of fact 
1
, 
disclosed. , 
. "\Ve haYe heretofore ruled that sumnian 
Judgment can properly be granted under Rui~ 
56 ( c) if the pleadings, depositions, admission1 
stipulations, together with any other proper er1• 
dence show without dispute that the party 1 ~ 
entitled to prevail." · 
Appellants apparently base their entire argume11t 
on this point on the theory that by their memorandum 
and pleadings, they have raised an issue of fact as to 
whether certain of respondent's agents in making the 
sale to appellants made various representations as to 
what would be contained in the life insurance policy 
and what would be contained in the mortgage loan 
documents. \Ve call the Court's attention to the appli· 
cation for life insurance (R. 90-91). Numbered Para· 
graph 2 of said application specifies that no agent, 
medical examiner, or other person, except the Presi-
dent, Yice President, the Secretary or the Treasurer, 
a Registrar or an Assistant Registrar of respondent 
has power to make or modify any contract of insurance 
on behalf of respondent, or to waive any of respond· 
ent' s rights or requirements. 
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Thl' application for the loan (Exhibit P-a) eon-
1a111s ..,ubstantially the same language in numbered 
t>:,raµ-wph H and particular attention is called to the 
I':! pitalized language at the bottom of the loan appli-
l':l tion form. 
The assignment of the life insurance (Exhibit P-4) 
~ karh "ds forth the rights of the respective parties in 
:111d t() the life insurance policy which is the subject 
. ,f the as-.ig11me11t. The second paragraph in the small 
'yp(' limih the respondent's rights in the insurance 
p• i\ic~ i11 the event of a default in the payment of any 
p1·t·1111tlllt. The fourth paragraph in the small type 
dearly seb forth the appellants' loan rights in con-
' :t'l'l ion with the life insurance. 
The policy itself which was issued on the joint 
l1H"s of the appellants is in evidence before this Court 
1 H. 8-t.- lOi), and clearly sets forth the cash values and 
diYi<lernl provisions as well as the insureds' loan rights. 
Such rights are modified only by the terms of the assign-
ment executed by the appellants. 
To permit the terms and conditions of these com-
plete contracts to be modified or varied by a claimed 
representation made prior to the execution of any of 
t lw documents in question would clearly violate the 
pa role eviclence rule and the trial court correctly so 
deeided in granting the respondent's motion for sum-
:nar.\· ,judgment. See 30 Am J ur 2d, Evidence, 
~cction 10!9, Page 184, and cases cited therein. 
7 
It appears from appellants' own brief th· . h . at tL, 
execution of t e var10us documents in quest
1
' · . 
. on 1~ all· 
m1ttecl, the amount that is due on the note is t 
1 no 1 1,. 
puted, and there is, in truth, no material quest· 
ion of 
fact between the parties requiring presentation of e,:. 
dence other than is already part of the Record t· I. 
. · IK tr 
such circumstance, we submit that the trial court p , rop. 
erly granted the respondent's motion for suinman 
judgment since the remaining matters in dispute ar~ 
solely questions of law which would always be deter-
mined by the court. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF SECTIOX~ 
31-27-2; 31-27-14; AND 31-27-15, UCA. 
Appellants quote Sections 31-27-14 and 31-27-U. 
Utah Code Annotated, in their brief. We should point 
out to the Court that these sections, as quoted, are a~ 
they now appear in the Utah Code, amended by Se~­
sion Laws of 1963. Since the revised sections did not 
become effective until .T uly 1, 1963, any reference 
thereto as applying to conduct prior to that time is 
improper. Our principal reason for pointing this matter 
out to the Court is that in passing the amendments, 
the Legislature made two very minor changes, neither 
of which change the substance of these provisions as 
applied to this suit. In Section 31-27-15, the Legis· 
la ture added in the second line of the Section the words 
"or annuity contract," thereby making the prohibitions 
8 
1 , 1 t;1al Scd ion etl'ectiYe not only in transactions im oh--
ii!.! p11rclia~e of insurance but also, transactions inn>lv-
i1i,:.: the purl'liase of annuity contracts. It is a matter 
1 ,1· L'<1111111on knO\dcdge that for many years, the re-
,pu11de11t and other insurance company lenders h:n·e 
,, 111T:tled in this State and other states under similar 
pl:iit-- ut' lending where the borrower also purchases 
;inll a-,~1.i..:·11;.; life insurance. It is certainly pertinent and 
1,111pn f<)I° the Court to consider that while the Legis-
l.1'1m· a111crnkd the statute and added to the prohibi-
1111rh :lll'ffol" '"or annuity contract," no legislative action 
,, ·1-. taken to add to the prohibitions thereof "or mort-
' t t. " g:ip.·(· 10an ransac ion. 
~\ ppcllants have not revealed the theory by which 
1111'~· claim respondent violated Section 31-27-2. Cer-
tai1dy. it cannot seriously be contended that by respond-
t'Id "" conduct. it would tend to acquire a monopoly of 
till insurance and loan business in the State of Ctn.h 
.1llrl be "cletrimental to free competition." 
111 appellants' argument under this point, it is 
stated that this Court has had no occasion to interpret 
the cp1oted sections of the Utah Code dealing with 
1mfair practices in the conduct of insurance business. 
\\"liile there do not appear to be any Utah cases on 
tlw matter. there is a reported case from the State of 
( )\iio. 'I'lu· Equitable Life Assurance Society of the 
l '11/tcd States '1.W. Robertson, Superintendent of lmmr-
111wc. 77 Ohio Law Abstract 18, 147 NE 2d 648 
1, 1 ~1.37'. which deals with the question and considers the 
9 
matter in great detail. The Ohio Statute, bein(r p . 
1 t'l ar". grap  3911.~0, Hevised Code, reads as follows: 
'·No life insurance company doing bus1·11 · 
tl . ,, e~~!' lis ~tate or any ... agent ... shall . . ·ill· ' . ff' . ( (.\\ giv~ or. o er to . . . a!low or give . . . diredlr 
or mdirectiY, as an mducement to insura · - . . nc~ 
any valuable consideration or indueeintiit 
" ... nor shall such company or person 1r 11 , 
or off er to give . . . as an inducement or ~011 • 
sideration for insurance, the loan of anv mone" 
directly or indirectly." · · 
This Statute is not materially different from the pr1,. 
visions of the Utah Code although since it specificaih 
includes "the loan of any money," it is more restrictiit. 
ln deciding the matter, the Court stated that the la: 1-
guage of the state was clear and unambiguous ann. 
therefore, any rules of statutory construction need no' 
be employed to determine the meaning intended by 
the legislature and in passing, the Court observed that 
the plan of The Equitable Life had been in operation 
in that State for many years and if it had been the 
desire and intention of the legislature to terminate 
such plan, it could have done so in clear and conci~e 
language. 
In holding that The Equitable Life Home Loan 
Plan did not violate the statute, the Court said 
" * * * No agent has the power or authority to 
. l * * • (J'ive offer or promise to secure a oan tl1er~fore, the plan per se is not violative of this 
provision * * *. The evidence is clea: that there 
must be insurance before the loan 1s approred 
10 
hut there is no assurance that the loan will be 
a ppro\cd merely because the insurance is pur-
l'l1:1..,l'd. The result is that under the plan. nothin.r . . ~ 
1d. ,-:due is given or promised to be sold as an 
i11d11ceme11t for insurance or in eonneetion there-
" ith .. \gai11, the latter is an essential element.'' 
• \ t a11othn point in the opinion, further discussing 
:lit rnattl'r t>f an inducement, the Court said 
"~\ careful examination of the details of the 
plan discloses that there is no element of inducc-
rnrnt for insurance in the plan itself. It is trnc 
t. hat plaintiff requires its insurance as securitv 
for the loan * * *. The plan per se as outline;! 
Ii~· the evidence does not place the plaintiff or any 
1>f its agents in the position of loaning or offer-
ing to loan money or of allowing or giving or 
offering to allow or give any \'aluahle considera-
tion or inducement as an inducement or con.~id­
t'l'afion for i11.rnrance." (Emphasis in original.) 
So far as we have been able to determine, the only 
1>tlwr ease which has considered the matter of the Home 
Loan Plan of The Equitable Life or any other insur-
:1m·c company as being violative of insurance codes is 
the l'ase of The Equitable Lif'e Assurance Society of 
the l' nitcd States t.w. Robert A. Crichton, lnsuraru..'e 
( '•1111 missioner of JV est Virginia. This case was heard 
in a circuit court in \Vest Virginia which is not a court 
·if record. The decision was handed down September 
:!O. 1!I;)1 and is reported in 14 CCH Life Cases, 1155. 
Seareli of the libraries of this Court, the University of 
l 'tah, and seyeral leading insurance attorneys in Salt 
Lake City has failed to reveal a set of CCII Life 
11 
Cases, and. for the Court's convenience, we reprint , 
an appendix to the brief the decision of the \\'est y,. 
ginia Court in this matter. The case arose upon a e;. 
lion by The Equitable Life Assurance Soeiet;. . 
enjoin and restrain the Insurance Commissioner 
0
i· ti··, 
State of \Vest Virginia from enforcing an order rt· 
quiring The Equitable to discontinue its Home Loaii 
Plan in the State of \Vest Virginia. The decision > 
made upon the complaint for such injunction and tl:r 
demurrer filed thereto by the Insurance Conunissioner. 
together with the briefs of the respective parties. TL. 
\Vest Virginia Statute in question is Section 18, Arfri
1 
2, Chapter 33 of the \Vest Virginia Code, which read.' 
"And no insurance agent, solicitor or broker 
personally or by any other party shall directh 
or indirectly offer a loan through any buildin~ 
association or bank or in any other way as an 
inducement to insurance nor shall any insm. 
ance agent, solicitor or broker require an appli· 
cant for a loan to cancel outstanding insurance 
in admitted and solvent companies; prm·ided. 
that an insurance agent, solicitor or broker ma1 
accept the renewal of any policy even though 
such agent, solicitor or broker represents a build-
ing association, bank or other party making the 
insured a loan if the insured protects the lende\ 
by an endorsement on the policy in proper form.' 
In holding that the AHO Plan did not violate the 
insurance statute above quoted, the Court emphasized 
the fact that for a long number of years, the loan plan 
had been operating in the State of West Virginia with· 
out objection from the Insurance Commissioner. 
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111 all'iWl'I' to appellants' argument on Point 111 
:'' rl':1ftn ca'ies will he cited i1wolving the inclusion of 
1 1, • .i1Hl Pllwr insurance premiums in payments. It 
,\:<J1ild iH' noted that in none of such cases was the 
111 :iltc r of a Yiolation of the insurance code raised before 
· iw <:t 1urts. 
POINT Ill 
l 'CLl ·s10~ OF INSVRANCE PREMll.:\lS 
1\ P.\ Y~IEXTS ON THE PRO.:\IISSOH.Y 
\l l l'E DOES XOT CONSTITUTE CSURY. 
l n arguing that the respondent's note is usurious 
liec:i ~1s<.· of the inclusion of insurance premiums in the 
pa:nnents proYided for, the appellants have cited no 
t"<hl''i an cl apparently take the position that the note 
i.'i usurious simply because the appellants say it is. 
There are many cases holding that such transaction 
cloC's not Yiolate usury statutes. Particularly in point is 
Tiu l!.'(111itr1hlc Life Assurance Societv of the United 
States ·r~. Kcrpcl, as .Misc. (2d) 856, 238 N.Y.S. 2d 
1lllti 119H:3), where the defense of usury was raised 
i11 a -.11it to foreclose a real estate mortgage. The factual 
sitiwtion is almost identical with the instant case. The 
trial court sustained Equitable's motion to strike the 
;1 tl'irmatiYe defense and entered judgment in its favor 
flll the pleadings. In so doing, the Court remarked 
·'The defendants contend that the purchase of 
-;aid insurance policy was a condition in ohtain-
lllg the loan; that the monthly premium of 
13 
$.~8.50 paid thereon was additional interest .. 
th t tl l 1 t . . .11,,: a le w 10 e ransaehon was therefore l 
tl t th 
. 
1
. l~llr,. 
ous; rn_, e msurance po icy was not taken 1)1.· 
on ti~~ hf.e of the owner of the property, :\hL. 
Jene 1. h.erpel, but on the life of Julius K"r 
1 l b l 
· '- ]11 I 
ier rns an.t; that. they neve~ consented to tit 
purchase of the paid-up term msurance. and tli:i 
1t was merely a means by which plaintiff retan1tr· 
!he surrender value of the policy as additiiin;,· 
mterest; that the purchase of the insurance 11 :t, 
p~rt of _a single transaction, and that the prt 
mmms m payment therefor were included ,, 
the terms of the bond and mortgage as add
1
. 
tional interest and that all these factors :ir 
proof that the whole transaction was usuriow,. 
"The test to determine whether or not a tra 11 ~. 
action is usurious is well stated in Clark Y. Shct-
han ( 47 N.Y. 188, 195): 
'If, by the collateral contract, some beneri: 
is secured to the lender, for which the borrower 
does not receive an equivalent, and which 
the lender would not have obtained, except 
for the loan, and which is intended as addi-
tional compensation for the loan, it is 1mir,11 
But if provision is made for full compc11.rn· 
tion to the borrower for all he may do under 
the collateral contract, there is no usury.· 
(Emphasis added) . 
"The defendants' mere assertions fail to rai~1 
any triable i..<?sue o.f fact. They off er _no. prol)f 
of flll/J bad faith on the part o.f plm11t1ff 11~1d 
1i"u proo.f that the premiums were either e.rcc.~.~ll't 
or not at the ordinary rates. The defendant 
Julius Kerpel receiYed all the usual rights :~nd 
benefits as the owner of the life insurance po~icy 
He receiYed dividends on the policy, obtained 
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loa11s thl'reo11, used part of said loans to pay the 
.11:-.tallme11ts due 011 the bond, and in addition 
1!inch1 was entitled to the cash surrender value 
ul' tlw policy. Ii~ the eYent of his death, the pro-
nT(b of the pohey would haYe satisfied the obli-
ira t 1011 of both defendants under the bond and 
Jcfr11da11t :\ladalene T. Kerpel would 'h:tYc 
mrned hn property free and cle:tr of the tirst 
111ortgage. ln addition thereto she woulcl haw 
licc11 entitled to the net amount remaining after 
payment of the obligation. (Emphasis added.) 
"The <lefendants received full value for the 
premium payments under the collateral contr:td, 
which was equiYalent to th€ benefits recei,·ed 
therefrom by the plaintiff. Even if the purchase 
of the collateral contract was a condition for 
the granting of the loan, it was independent of 
it ancl the premiums paid thereunder were not 
additional interest." 
The ~ ew York Court's statement as to the benefits 
m·ein'd by the insureds in the Kerpel case are precisely 
t lit' l)('nctits which appellants would have received under 
the life insurance policy had they continued to make 
pa~·me11ts on the loan and the policy until such time 
:1-, the policy, by its own terms, had a cash surrender 
11r luan rnlue. Even in the brief twenty-three month 
period when payments were made, had either of ap-
pellants died or been killed, the insurance proceeds 
\\11ulcl haYe paid in full the mortgage balance and the 
~11rYi,·ing appellant, as beneficiary, would have received 
i11 <'ash such amount as had already been paid on the 
pri11e1pal of the loan. 
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11~ .an earlier New York case, John 1-lancoc/, J/, 
tual L1jc Insurance Compan,1; vs. Nichols, 55 How. 1., 
:390 ( 1878), the court reJ· ected the def ens" <>t' .... lh11r 
\!ta ting: 
"Assuming, howe\·er, that the evidenee i , , ~ci.cut. to warrant the inference that the ~]~~11 '. 
tdl rcf ~1scd to ma~.;:e the loan unless the defen•\. 
a~1t effe~ted the msurance put in evide!lee 11 , 
hnn, I tlunk the transaction was not usurious t"·r 
two reasons. ( 1) The plaintiff gaYe quid pi 
quo for the premiums received. ( 2) \Vhether 11
1 
insurance would enable it to acquire a legal .1 
terest on the sum loaned depended upon the l'<J!,. 
tingency of the assured living for a period Jo11 ( 
enough to produce that result. It is not llll· 
lawful for a lender to refuse to lend to pers(l111 
who are not his customers. The business of th 
plaintiff is to make insurance upon liws. I: 
must invest its surplus funds. To confine it· 
loans to its patrons is no more than fair rr<'i· 
procity. There may be cases where the issuin~ 
of policies of life insurance is resorted to a~ :1 
mere shift or device to cover up the real tra11,. 
action which is an usurious one; but that is n11: 
the case here." 
One of the leading cases is H aeberlin vs. Jeff ers(/11 
Standard Life Insurance Co., 114 ,V. Ya. 198, 171 S.E 
H 9 ( 1933) . In that case, the borrower applied to a11 
insurance company lender for a mortgage loan 11! 
*27 ,500.00 which was granted only on the conditin11 
that the borrower take out a ten-year endowment polic1 
on his life for the period of the loan. It should be note11 
that an endowment policy is probably the most expen· 
16 
, 1, ( 1·,1rn1 of i11s11ranel·. The Supreme Court of Appcab 
,
1 
:i 1, :-itatc of' \\'est \·irginia held that this rnllateral 
,(,·1,r1\\ :1,~1Tt·11w1tl was Yalicl, writing as follows: 
· There are l wo transadions, one, the loan; 
tk otlin. the i11sura11ce. The company extended 
t 1111 consideration for the premiums paid in as-
"1m1111g the insurance risk, and the added bene-
ti t l<l llacberlin therefore rested upon i11de-
pc11dc11 t and legal eonsideration. Certainly, to 
dence that the transaction is tainted with usury 
and that insurance premiums paid by Ilaeberli;1 
-,liould now be applied to the unpaid principal 
or interest on the loan as the bill seeks to liaYe 
done. would he inequitable, for then the borrow-
er would ha Ye recei,·ed life insurance free since 
the year 19i6." 
One who claims usury must prove intent 011 the 
pa rt of the lewler to exact rate of interest higher than 
:dl(i\\cd by law as was said in United States Hank t's. 
W11u.1;c11cr. a.i e.s. 378, 9 L. Ed. 163: 
..... l n cons.truing the usury laws, the uni-
form constfuction in England has been (and 
it is equally applicable here) that to constitute 
11sury within the prohibitions of the law, there 
must he an intention knowingly to contract 
for or to take usurious interest; for if neither 
party internled it, but act bona fide and inno-
eently. the law will not infer a corrupt agree-
ment. \\'here indeed the contract upon its very 
face imports usury as by express reservation 
ot' more than legal interest, there is no room for 
presumption. for the intent is apparent; res ipsa 
loq11itm. \\'here the contract on its face is for 
legal interest only, there it must be prond that 
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there was some corru1)t agreement 01. <I".· 
l . . '\ ll"!. s llf t to coyer usury; and that it was in tl . · 
l . , l , it 1 1 co11 tern p a ti on of t 1e parties. · ' 
The purpose and intent of the usury statute "' 
course, to prohibit a lender from recoYering inor" +;. 
L ,[i,[ 
the permitted profit from the lending of momT. ~ 1111 
the respondent is a mutual life insurance comp.ait\. ,~ 
corpora ted under the laws of the State of Xe\\ \" •r, 
it is operated for the benefit of all policy holder~ \lh. 
share in diYisible surplus. In a very real sense, it d,, 
11ot han~ "profits." .Mutual life insurance is i11~ma1. 
at cost with any excess premium going back to the p()l l 
holders in the form of annual dividends. The p11lic 
in question provides for dividends (R. 98). Cnder tl, 
Insurance Law of the State of New York, the respo11.: 
cnt is required to annually ascertain and apporti111 
divisible surplus (New York Insurance Law. Pa:. 
1Hi). In the case of Fidclit/j & Casualty vs. Jlctropoii. 
tan Life, 42 l\1isc. R. (2d) 616, Supreme Court Xe" 
York County 1963, the Court appropriately describe<l 
the status of a mutual life insurance company when : 
wrote at Page 624, 
··since a mutual company is operated wholh 
for the benefit of its policy holders. its (sic 
functions to provide insurance at cost rather 
than to amass profits in the ordinary busine" 
sense. \Yhile the initial premium paid h~· thr 
policy holder usually represents a sm~ewhat 111· 
flated estimate of the cost of the policy at tht· 
end of the vear when such cost is actuall~· a•-
certained. tl~e company is required to return ti 
its policy holders the excess premium, that 1 ~ 
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tl1t alllllllllt in excl'ss of the company·.-. al'lual 
l'! IS l. 
l'k fad that a policy holdl'r in a mutual life i11-
,11r:i<!l't l·,1111pau~ l'l'l'ein~s insurance at cost has also 
:,. 111 n·tP.!..!111/l'd hy the t·nited States Supreme Court i11 
\ 7, 1·,,i1, J,itc J11.rnra11cc Cump<lll,I/ i·s. llo1t.·cr.'I, ~H:> 
1 ..... :2-~:2 . l !1:w 1 ; 1'0111 JI utual Cumpany t's. Lcdacr, 
~ -)~ l .S . . >~:~. 
!Lid the appellants maintained their policy in force 
,, 111u1T than the brief twenty-three month period, they 
... 1dd ha n· received diYidends and the policy would 
i :. 1,, aC'quired l'ash and loan values as specified therein. 
POINT IV 
COXTHACTS \VHICH VIOLATE THE IX-
:-il-IL\:"d.'E CODE AUE NOT VOID . 
.:\ ppellants argue under Point IV in their brief 
'.lial all acts and contracts which violate the quoted 
,('(·tio11s (If the Insurance Code are void ab initio. This 
1-, :t11 111teresti11g theory but is not the law. 
\\'e point out Section 31-27-16, Utah Code Anno-
'atf·d. l!l.>:~. wherein the penalty for violating these 
'l ~·t 1<111s i-. ..,et forth. 
Thi-. Court in the case of Ross vs. Produar.Y .llu-
' •1ul I 11s11r1111cc Company, 4 Utah 2d 396, 295 P.2d 339, 
, . .,:hidered and ruled against a similar contention.The 
l'11mt -.lated: 
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''\'iolation of the anti-reb·iting secti · 
· t • t t • · · l . . · . · · ' . o II o ! t l t· s .i t.1 cs su l.JCds the lllsured to proseeutioii f, 
a misdemeanor a11d to renit"ation of it·· 1· .. · 
t I l . . 1 . " IC t ''" o < o n1s1ness wit 1111 the state. the s·1111., . . '' ' pt·11· 
ties imposed for a violation of the seetj
01 
I" 
I . l . I ]( 1, lllH er eons1< eration. (See. aI-27-15 ! . l~ t 
. ' ll ". 
respeet1ve of these. sand.ions, it has geiierali 
b~en held that. su~h 1~l~gahty may not be plt-adi, 
either to anlld 11ahd1ty 011 the contract 
11
r , 
ret"over the amount paid or promised as a rd". 
and .this is so ~vheth~"r the plea i~ attempted,,' 
the mstanee of the msured, the msurn or ' 
beneficiary." (Citing cases.) ' ,Ji, 
Since this Court has held that an insurance p11lii·. 
is not void if issued in violation of the quoted setti111,, 
it must follow that collateral documents execuktl 
t'Oilllection therewith are certainly not void. 
POINT V 
ASSIGN~IENTS OF FUTlJRE IUGIIT~ 
OH I:KTERESTS ARE YALID AXD E\. 
FORCEABLE. 
As pointed out in the Statement of Facts. the lift 
insurance policy was, in fact, issued on July I:?, l~tl.'l 
and the September I, 1963 register date is merely the 
day on which the first premium thereunder was dw 
and payable. It should be noted that the insurnm" 
policy itself bears the notation "This policy has beei. 
assigned to the Society as collateral security for a real 
estate mortgage loan" (R. 84) and further that tlw 
assignment itself (Exhibit P-4) in the third paragraph 
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, 1, 'Ill t l w end 1Tsnn·s to the respondent the right to 
, , 11 1d11r-.t· the policy. Obviously, the emlorseme11t could 
, , " I it· p \;1 ccd 011 the policy until an assignment had 
.,,1·11 c\tt'llll'd. The policy, by its own terms, was in 
; 11 i\ 11,n·t· and effect from after July 12, 196:3. As ex-
i"1 -.-.t·ll i11 the application which is part of the poliey 
, , .-.-.1lt'.I : H. ~Hl-!11), the insurance was in force at sueh 
·,;tit ;1-. tlw Society was satisfied that the proposed 
1 .... 111T1l "a:- insurable and qualified. (See Paragraph 
~ , t .\µTct·nwnt in the application. The assignment, 
• :,, r 1'pn" dealt with a present right-an issued policy 
l1lt'l: had not ~·et been released or delivered . 
. \-.ide from the foregoing, however, it is interesting 
'·' 1Tad the unsupported statement of appellants that 
'Ji, p1 d ic~· could not be assigned since it was not in 
IH·111g. For a contrary conclusion, see 6 Am Jur 2d, 
. \ -.-.ignmenb. Section 8, Page 192, 
"The assignment of contingent interests, ex-
pectancies. and things not in esse, but resting 
i11 mere possibility, is recognized and takes ef-
feet when the thing assigned comes in existence 
pr()\·iding it was fairly made, is supported by 
a o,;ufficient consideration, and is not contrary 
to public policy." 
( i tl-d i 11 the footnote are cases from many jurisdictions, 
i1wl11ding l-tah. In Latimer vs. Holida,11, 103 Utah 152, 
l :1+ P.:2d 18:3. this Court said at Page 158 Utah Re· 
ports: 
"\\'here the assignment of an expectancy is 
fairly made. supported by a fair consideration, 
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equity will enforce it if not contrary to 1 l • ,, • PLJ I, po icy. 
~Vhether the policy be considered as hning ht• 
Ill existence when the assignment was executed 
1
, i1. 
material. 111 either eYent, the assignment would lit 
valid and enforceable document. 
CONCLUSION 
l t is respectfully submitted that there are no d1,. 
puted questions of fact material to the dispositior1 , · 
this matter. The trial court correctly ruled as a mattt 
of law that the note, mortgage and assignment of 1,. 
surance are Yalid and enforceable legal documents. :111·: 
that the respondent is entitled to enforcement there1: 
in accordance with their terms. The findings of fa, 
and decree of the trial court should be affirmed w1;1 
costs to the respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'Vallace D. Hurd of 
BAYLE, HURD & LAUCHXOH 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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APPEXDIX 
l )t·t·1-.1011 llt' llw C ir('uit Court of Kanawha County . ' 
\\'est Yirginia) 
State of 'Yest Virginia 
Thirteenth .J uclicial Circuit 
Charleston 
.1 i. l1a11 F. Bouelwlle 
.l11dge 
\l1· l'l1::rlt-. E. ~L1ha11 
1-"·1;- t'l tn ilk. \\'est \·irginia 
\ l 1 . \\ • ii I 1a111 T. 0' Farrell 
l·k1rl:· ... tll11. \\'est Yirginia 
\ 
1 r l.L·11 D Fitzgerald 
September 20, rn.n 
14 CCH 1155 Life Cases 
1 o Equita hie Life .Assurance Society 
:\ ew York, N. Y. 
ll1111(Jrahlt- \\'illiam C. ~Iarlarnl, Attorney 
( ~t:11eral of \\'est Yirginia · 
.\!tt·ntion: :\Ir. T. D. Kauffelt, Assistant 
. \ ttorney ( ;eneral of 'Vest Virginia 
Charleston. \Vest Virginia 
111 Ile: The Equitable Life Assurance Society 
of the Cnited States, a Corporation 
Y. 
Rohert A. Crichton, individually and 
as Insurance Commissioner of the 
State of \Vest Virginia 
han earefully considered the matters arising 
llJHlll t hl' amended bill of complaint, demurrer thereto, 
;111d brief.-; tiled 011 behalf of the respective parties. 
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The priueiples guidi11g a eourt in the cuiist. 
• IU\'.\• 
of sta~utes, after a long period of a<lmiuistratii t l'·· 
struet1011 a11<l enforcement, were considered Iii· , 
court i11 the reeent case of Algoma Coal ~ Cul.c. (',',, 
pany v. Ale .. rnnder, 67 S.E. 2d, 201, i11vuh ing 
1 
statutes relating to the respective duties of ··n1-.. I '- j( 1~.v·, 
an<l "sectio11 foreman," Code Chapter 22, Artil'lt 
In that case I held that there was no ambiguity. d
1111
:-
or uncertainty as to the meaning and inte11t of 1:, 
statutes, an<l that the doctrine of administratiYe c11: 
struction was not applicable and denied the prayn ! 
injunctive relief. :My action in that regard was b;1,. 
upon the case of State v. Conley, et al., 118 '"·Ya .. ill' 
i11vo1Yi11g the construction of the constitutional pn·1. 
sion for an irreducible school fund, Const. Art. XI: 
Sec . .J., amended and modified November, 1902, whit" 
the Supreme Court held was plain, certain and un· 
ambiguous, and that long continued administrative crn-
struction permitting investment of the school fund 
contrary to the provision of the statute did not mn 
lend persuasiYe weight. 
In the instant case I am of the opm1on that thl 
principles announced in the Algoma and Conley ca~t· 
are not determinative here. The rather lengthy prm"· 
sions of Code, 32-218, (Ser. 3299), contain inhere1:: 
contradictions, ambiguities and uncertainties, "as ht 
who runs may read;" and, therefore, the statute as aci· 
ministered for such a long period of time prior to tht 
suit here, and apparently so clearly understood a11·! 
construed by predecessors of the defendant, gin mud 
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", 11-!·lt; and guidance to the court in endeavori11g to 
,. 11 ,1t' a'. thl' true intent and purpose of the statute . 
. \' t,1 this there ca1mot be the least doubt upon co11-
'"lnatio11 11f tlic re:i....,ons motivating the legislation 
_11 id '.Ill' applicatio11 of the enacted statute as shown by 
: 111 1ml1n oi" administrative declarations by two auditors 
•1 , , :-.: 1itrit·io 111.surance Commissioners as set forth in 
plaiI1titf-. Appendix. It may not be amiss to obserH 
1l1al thl' ineumbcnt State Auditor, familiarly known 
1, tl11 ·\\'a tch-Dog" of the State's treasury, and equally 
11. ll h.1111\\ 11 to he keenly vigilant and alert to scrutinize, 
,!i'tt l't :llld correct any improper practices of corpora-
~ , 111-.. and especially insurance companies, was for a 
I· 111i.; period of time ex officio Insurance Commissioner. 
11 ad ht' felt that the A.H.O. plan, inherited from his 
11r:·deLT'>sors and continued under him, was in clear con-
tr.we11tion of the statute, to the gra,·e detriment arnl 
i11.i11ry of the people, especially those availing them-
-.dws of the plan under his constant surveillance, he 
\\'(11ilcl long since have "given tongue." His silence nnd 
i11:1dion may ineluctably be held as his official admi11-
i·dratin· construction of the plan, as against that of the 
'kfr11d:rnt's. in more forceful and eloquent terms, per-
l1ap.-;. than the unequivocal recorded pronouncements of 
l11s prc·decessors. Defendant's brief contains the follow-
1nu: -;tatement: "The office of Insurance Commissioner 
11 f \Y t·-;t Yirginin. as such, was not created until 1947. 
Prior to that time. the Auditor served as Insurance 
< 'i 1mmission<'r. along with his other multitudinous du-
'. t"-.. He oln·iously hn<l very little time to devote to his 
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<lUlH~s as 111suraiH:e C01lll1lissiu11er * t, ,,_ · 1.: • 
1 • ..JUI l' \. i·, 
..:Hwruey li-e11erals utfice is uut tu be take
11 
,. • ·• 
.'Ill IUlJ~ 
111 tills uueram:e w1il1 respect tu ti1e i11cuml>eut , .. 
"'-UUJu1 
who was tor some fourteen years 111sw·au'·e L " u11uu., 
s10ner. 
lJefeuuaut s bnef nlaces much reliauce U}J . _ r UIJ 11 ,,_ 
begummg termmulogy of the statute, .. ~\ o 111e msuraii·. 
company doing business iu this state***," ete. _,;\
111
t
1 
casual reading of the statute would show that that jJ•: 
tion of the statute relates only to <liscrimiuatwl! a: 
between policy holders, rates for such form of m~ur 
auce, rebates, etc. The defendant would apply tl1t Ja,_ 
two paragraphs of the statute to such and eo11~tru·_ 
them as inhibiting the making of A.H.0. loans hy ;J;· 
plaiu tiff. The terminology used in said paragra p11,_ 
such as cancel, renewal, etc., is not and has never bt'tl 
used in regard to life insurance policies, but only a, 
to fire insurance policies, as contended by the pla111-
tiff. And the word "building Association" has no plal'~ 
in the statute relating to life insurance companies. U'. 
course, the words, "insurance agent, solicitor or broker. 
are used in connection with all forms of insurance. Tht 
defendant would apparently apply the doctrine 1 '-
cjusdem r;encris to the statute for the reason that i~ 
begins with the phrase, "No life insurance compam 
* * *.'' This, in my opinion, is wholly untenablt. B~ 
no process of logical reasoning can the first ffre para· 
graphs of the statute be transposed to and entwinrJ 
in the last two paragraphs to sustain defendant's argti-
ment. Such would, indeed, tend to bring about a situa-
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: .1111 1if ·co1ifus1011 worse confounded." I refer to thl' 
. I: 1rnc11l :-ell knees of this section as paragraphs for 
i·Ltrity. for i11 reality such they are, and should he so 
... 111•-idcred. 
It i" 11ot necessary for the court to engage upon 
:i d1"~t'rtatio11 a" to the meaning of the word "i11duee-
iw11! · dl': 11cither is it necessary for the court to dis-
1'"" tl11 t'al'l raised by the defendant in its brief that 
\ill' plai11titl' will not aecept life insurance in other com-
11.111it·s. Th(' reason and neeessity for this is obvious. 
\ \'liile the court is not in the least concerned with 
dlt' lllulin·s which may prompt an admininstrativc 
agTIH'Y i11 <.:ondudi11g its affairs, it is quite at a loss-
t1• 1111derstawl the complete "right about face" of the 
.. ;.!l'lll')' here inn>h-ed in this matter. Certainly there can 
liaw· been no public agitation or demand for such re,·er-
~al of a long continued praetice which enured greatly to 
thl' benefit of a eonsiderable portion of the population 
(If the state, principally people of average or small in-
t·onH·s. Being enabled to obtain such loans upon such 
lw11eticial terms. they were thereby furnished an escape 
from the vicious and usurious talons of building and 
hlll a11<l small loan companies. To sustain defendant's 
l'o11tention would be to strike down a plan and system, 
:11h·:mtagr of which has been taken by so many of 'Yest 
Yir!!inia home owners without any question by agency 
11 r c·ourt as to their validity, and for which the court 
'' 111 1t eonscious of the least murmer of public clam'>r. 
Th(' demurrer to the amended bill of complaint 
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will al'l'onlingly he overruled upon all poinb tht·rL'. 
l'mmsel will at their l'onvenience prepare prop('r 1 rd" 
for my endorsement, making this letter memorand 11i 
a part of thl' rel'ord thereof, if it be so desired. 
The briefs filt>d by counsel are herewith rd 11 m 
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